Transistors, the building blocks of modern electronics, are typically made of silicon. Because it’s a semiconductor, this material can control the flow of electricity in a circuit. But silicon has fundamental physical limits that restrict how compact and energy-efficient a transistor can be.

MIT researchers have now replaced silicon with a magnetic semiconductor, creating a magnetic transistor that could enable smaller, faster, and more energy-efficient circuits. The material’s magnetism strongly influences its electronic behavior, leading to more efficient control of the flow of electricity. 

The team used a novel magnetic material and an optimization process that reduces the material’s defects, which boosts the transistor’s performance.

The material’s unique magnetic properties also allow for transistors with built-in memory, which would simplify circuit design and unlock new applications for high-performance electronics.

“People have known about magnets for thousands of years, but there are very limited ways to incorporate magnetism into electronics. We have shown a new way to efficiently utilize magnetism that opens up a lot of possibilities for future applications and research,” says Chung-Tao Chou, an MIT graduate student in the departments of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) and Physics, and co-lead author of a paper on this advance.

Chou is joined on the paper by co-lead author Eugene Park, a graduate student in the Department of Materials Science and Engineering (DMSE); Julian Klein, a DMSE research scientist; Josep Ingla-Aynes, a postdoc in the MIT Plasma Science and Fusion Center; Jagadeesh S. Moodera, a senior research scientist in the Department of Physics; and senior authors Frances Ross, TDK Professor in DMSE; and Luqiao Liu, an associate professor in EECS, and a member of the Research Laboratory of Electronics; as well as others at the University of Chemistry and Technology in Prague. The paper appears today in Physical Review Letters.

Overcoming the limits

In an electronic device, silicon semiconductor transistors act like tiny light switches that turn a circuit on and off, or amplify weak signals in a communication system. They do this using a small input voltage.

But a fundamental physical limit of silicon semiconductors prevents a transistor from operating below a certain voltage, which hinders its energy efficiency.

To make more efficient electronics, researchers have spent decades working toward magnetic transistors that utilize electron spin to control the flow of electricity. Electron spin is a fundamental property that enables electrons to behave like tiny magnets.

So far, scientists have mostly been limited to using certain magnetic materials. These lack the favorable electronic properties of semiconductors, constraining device performance.

“In this work, we combine magnetism and semiconductor physics to realize useful spintronic devices,” Liu says.

The researchers replace the silicon in the surface layer of a transistor with chromium sulfur bromide, a two-dimensional material that acts as a magnetic semiconductor.

Due to the material’s structure, researchers can switch between two magnetic states very cleanly. This makes it ideal for use in a transistor that smoothly switches between “on” and “off.”

“One of the biggest challenges we faced was finding the right material. We tried many other materials that didn’t work,” Chou says.

They discovered that changing these magnetic states modifies the material’s electronic properties, enabling low-energy operation. And unlike many other 2D materials, chromium sulfur bromide remains stable in air.

To make a transistor, the researchers pattern electrodes onto a silicon substrate, then carefully align and transfer the 2D material on top. They use tape to pick up a tiny piece of material, only a few tens of nanometers thick, and place it onto the substrate.

“A lot of researchers will use solvents or glue to do the transfer, but transistors require a very clean surface. We eliminate all those risks by simplifying this step,” Chou says.

Leveraging magnetism

This lack of contamination enables their device to outperform existing magnetic transistors. Most others can only create a weak magnetic effect, changing the flow of current by a few percent or less. Their new transistor can switch or amplify the electric current by a factor of 10.

They use an external magnetic field to change the magnetic state of the material, switching the transistor using significantly less energy than would usually be required.

The material also allows them to control the magnetic states with electric current. This is important because engineers cannot apply magnetic fields to individual transistors in an electronic device. They need to control each one electrically.

The material’s magnetic properties could also enable transistors with built-in memory, simplifying the design of logic or memory circuits.

A typical memory device has a magnetic cell to store information and a transistor to read it out. Their method can combine both into one magnetic transistor.

“Now, not only are transistors turning on and off, they are also remembering information. And because we can switch the transistor with greater magnitude, the signal is much stronger so we can read out the information faster, and in a much more reliable way,” Liu says.

Building on this demonstration, the researchers plan to further study the use of electrical current to control the device. They are also working to make their method scalable so they can fabricate arrays of transistors.

This research was supported, in part, by the Semiconductor Research Corporation, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Army Research Office, and the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports. The work was partially carried out at the MIT.nano facilities.

Conditions so far in 2026 raise fears of summer water shortages, crop failures and major blazes. Climate change is a culprit for heat.

The country’s low power bills are a result of big subsidies.

Attorneys for the alleged hacker-for-hire have said Exxon and one of its lobbying firms were involved in a plan to steal information from climate advocates.

Friends of the Earth is opposing a carbon removal pilot project that was approved by the Trump administration.

President Donald Trump has floated several — at times contradictory — ways for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, even as Iran’s blockade is already driving up prices and squeezing economies amid an uncertain future.

This year's Free Land protest is opposing what Indigenous people see as infringements of their land rights by corporations advancing farming, logging and mining projects.

Weak rainfall in one of the world’s major producers of rice, wheat, sugar and cotton can lead to water shortages, lower yields and higher imports of staples.

CATL has been expanding its mining footprint for much of the last decade, taking stakes in several overseas operations and expanding its own lithium projects at home.

This is the third installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. You can read the first post here, and the second here.

When people remember the 2011 uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), they picture crowded squares, raised phones, and the feeling that the internet had finally shifted the balance of power toward ordinary people. But the past decade and a half is also a story about how governments, companies, and platforms turned those same tools into the backbone of a powerful state surveillance apparatus.

For activists, journalists, and everyday users, that means now living with a constant threat: the phone in your pocket, the platforms you organize on, and the systems you rely on for safety and connection can be weaponized at the flip of a switch. A global surveillance industry has treated repression by many MENA governments as a growth opportunity, and the tactics refined there now shape digital authoritarianism worldwide. This essay traces how that shift unfolded: security agencies upgraded older systems of repression with new surveillance tools and permanent monitoring infrastructure; cybercrime laws and mercenary spyware markets turned digital control into standard operating procedure; and biometrics, facial recognition, and ‘smart city’ projects laid the groundwork for AI‑driven surveillance that now shapes protests, borders, and everyday life far beyond the region. 

Remembering the Arab Spring today means seeing the events of 2011 as both a remarkable moment of movement history when people leveraged networked tools in their fight for freedom and the beginning of a long, grinding effort to turn those same tools into mechanisms of state control.

Old‑School Repression, New‑School Tools

Long before Facebook and Twitter, regimes in places like Egypt and Syria already knew how to crush dissent. They leaned on informant networks, physical surveillance, and wiretaps, backed by emergency laws that let security agencies monitor and detain critics with almost no restraint. Research on the use of surveillance technology in MENA shows that, even before the Arab Spring, states were layering early digital tools like internet monitoring, deep packet inspection, and interception centers on top of that older machinery of control.

At the same time, connectivity was racing ahead. Cheap smartphones and social media suddenly let people share information at scale, coordinate protests, and broadcast abuses in real time. In 2011, EFF described both the excitement around “Facebook revolutions” and the early signs that governments were scrambling to upgrade their capacity to watch and disorganize popular dissent.

After the uprisings, Western critics endlessly debated how much credit to give social media itself. While in the background, security agencies across several MENA states reached a much simpler conclusion: if networked communication can help topple a dictator, then they needed to embed themselves deep inside those networks. Analyses of the rise of digital authoritarianism in MENA show how quickly officials pivoted from being surprised by online organizing to building systems to monitor and pre‑empt it.

In the years after 2011, governments across the region poured money into expanding internet monitoring and deep packet inspection, investing heavily in tools that let them systematically watch what people said and did on major platforms. Foreign vendors set up monitoring centers and interception systems that let security agencies block tens of thousands of sites, scrape and analyze social media at scale, monitor activist pages and online communities, and track activists in real time. They took the lesson of 2011 and built a new, pre‑emptive model of digital control, one that assumes the state should see as much as possible, as early as possible.

As we noted in 2011, exporting permanent surveillance infrastructure to already‑abusive governments doesn’t “modernize” public safety; it locks in an architecture of control that is primed to abuse dissidents, journalists, and marginalized communities.

Domestic Lawfare and Cyber-Mercenaries

The surveillance tech stack was only half the story. After the uprisings, a number of governments also rewrote the rules that govern online life. Cybercrime laws, “fake news” provisions, and overbroad public‑order and ‘morality’ offences gave prosecutors and security agencies legal cover to act with impunity. Governments in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt combined counterterrorism, cybercrime, defamation, and protest laws into a legal thicket designed to make online dissent feel dangerous and costly. Morality laws and cybercrime provisions are used to target queer and trans people based on identity and expression.​

At the United Nations, a new global cybercrime convention now risks baking this logic into international law. The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in late 2024, despite serious human rights concerns raised by civil society. Echoing our partners, EFF warned at the time that the UN cybercrime draft convention remained too flawed to adopt and urged states to reject the draft language because it legitimized expansive surveillance powers and criminalized legitimate expression, security research, and everyday digital practices around the world. 

While on paper, these instruments gesture to “public safety” objectives, in practice they function as pathways for state security agencies to monitor, prosecute, and silence the communities most at risk. For state-targeted communities, that makes being visible online a calculated risk, not a neutral choice.​​

But criminal codes are only half the story. Mercenary tech is the other. 

As governments worldwide looked for ways to outpace their critics, a parallel market emerged to help them infiltrate and take over devices. Companies like NSO Group marketed Pegasus and similar tools as off‑the‑shelf capabilities for governments that wanted to hack a target’s cellphones or other devices to read messages, turn on microphones, and monitor entire social networks while bypassing the courts. 

In 2019, UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye called for a global moratorium on the sale and transfer of private surveillance tools until real, enforceable safeguards exist. Two years later, forensic work by Amnesty and media partners showed how the same spyware used to hack phones of Palestinian human‑rights defenders was used to surveil journalists, activists, lawyers, and political opponents across dozens of countries. 

Regional groups responded by demanding an end to the sale of surveillance technology to autocratic governments and security agencies, arguing that you cannot keep selling “lawful intercept” tools into systems where law itself is an instrument of repression. Commercial spyware is at the center of digital repression, not at its margins. Surveillance vendors are not neutral suppliers. Safeguards remain weak, fragmented, or nonexistent in most of the countries buying these tools, yet vendors continue seeking new contracts and new militarized “use cases.” In other words, the companies that design, market, and maintain these systems precisely because they enable this kind of control profit from and help entrench authoritarian power.

Biometrics, Facial Recognition, and AI‑Powered Surveillance Cities

On top of this rapidly intensifying interception and spyware stack, governments and companies began layering biometrics and face recognition into everyday systems, creating pathways for bulk data collection, automated analysis, and risk profiling. In parts of MENA, national ID schemes, border and migration controls, and centralized biometric databases have been rolled out in environments with weak or captured data‑protection laws, making it easy to link people’s movements, services, and political activity to a single, persistent identifier.​

Humanitarian programs are not exempt from this protocol. In Jordan, Syrian refugees have been required to submit iris scans and biometric data to access cash assistance and food, turning “consent” into a precondition for survival. When access to aid depends on enrollment in centralized biometric systems, any breach, misuse, or repurposing of that data can have severe, life‑altering consequences for people who have no realistic way to opt out. Investigations into surveillance‑tech firms complicit in abuses in MENA show that vendors profit from supplying biometric and surveillance tools for migration management and internal security, even when those tools are used in discriminatory or abusive ways.​

Mass, indiscriminate surveillance technologies were first piloted in MENA on people who are already criminalized or made vulnerable by poverty, but their use quickly expanded from narrow, security‑framed deployments at borders and checkpoints to routine use in welfare offices, aid distribution sites, and city streets. As hardware for sensors, cameras, and data storage got cheaper and “smart city” surveillance systems promised seamless security and services, it became easier and less politically contentious to keep these systems running everywhere, all the time.​

Unlike targeted hacking tools, these broad, city‑wide surveillance infrastructures built on camera networks, persistent sensors, and biometric databases erase any practical line between people under investigation and the broad public, normalizing bulk, indiscriminate monitoring of public space and everyday movement. In the Gulf, facial recognition and dense sensor networks are increasingly built into high‑profile “smart city” and mega‑project plans that lean heavily on biometric and AI‑driven monitoring. These are security‑first development projects where biometric and sensor infrastructures are designed from the outset to embed policing, migration control, and commercial tracking into the urban fabric. In this vision of the Gulf’s “smart city” future—often sold as seamless services and digital opportunity—“smart” is the branding, and pervasive monitoring is the operating principle.​​

EFF has consistently opposed government use of face recognition and biometric surveillance, in some instances calling for outright bans. In contexts that treat peaceful dissent as a security threat, embedding biometric surveillance into everyday infrastructure locks in a balance of power that favors militarized policing and state control. That infrastructure is now the starting point for a new set of risks. Surveillance systems built over the last decade are being repackaged as the foundation for a new generation of “AI‑enabled” defense and security products. 

Companies that once focused on video management or perimeter security now advertise “defense applications” for AI‑driven situational awareness and threat detection, using computer‑vision models to scan camera feeds, compare against existing watchlists, and flag “suspicious” people or behaviors in real time. Drone and sensor platforms are being upgraded with embedded AI that tracks and classifies targets autonomously and with “drone‑based AI threat detection and intelligent situational awareness,” turning aerial surveillance into a continuous data feed for security agencies and militaries. In smart‑city and defense expos from the Gulf to Europe and North America, similar systems are marketed as neutral efficiency upgrades or tools to “protect critical infrastructure,” even where they are explicitly designed to scale up border enforcement, protest surveillance, and internal security operations.

As these systems are folded into AI‑driven defense products, the line between “civilian” infrastructure and militarized surveillance disappears, turning streets, borders, and aid sites into continuous input for security operations. That is the landscape that human rights and accountability efforts now have to confront.

Templates of Control, Networks of Resistance

The patterns established in heavily securitized MENA states after the Arab Spring now shape how states monitor and crush more recent uprisings, from Iran’s use of location data and facial recognition to track down protesters to long‑running crackdowns elsewhere in the region. This model of “digital authoritarianism” built on spyware, data‑hungry ID systems, platform control, and emergency‑style security laws has emerged everywhere from Latin America to Eastern Europe to here in the United States. As the new UN Cybercrime Convention moves toward implementation, its broad offences and surveillance powers risk turning this ad hoc toolkit into a formal template for cross‑border data‑sharing, repression, and an all‑purpose global surveillance instrument.

For people on the ground, none of this is theoretical. Human‑rights defenders, journalists, and ordinary users across the region face arrest, long prison sentences, and exile based on their digital traces. In that landscape, commercial spyware is not a side issue but part of the core machinery of repression. Pegasus has been used to hack journalists’ phones through zero‑click exploits and compromise human‑rights defenders and watchdog organizations themselves, including staff at Amnesty’s Pegasus Project partners and Human Rights Watch. These deployments give practical effect to the “cybercrime” and “terrorism” frameworks described earlier: person‑by‑person campaigns against particular communities, contacts, and networks, rather than neutral, generalized security measures.

Under these conditions, everyday security becomes a second job. People describe carrying multiple phones, keeping one for relatively “clean” uses and others for riskier conversations, splitting identities across platforms, using coded language, and moving their organizing off mainstream services when possible. Pushing this burden onto users is a political choice: states, platforms, and vendors could build systems that are safe by design; instead, they externalize risk to the people they watch and punish.

Even against that backdrop, civil society organizations have refused to cede the terrain to security agencies and vendors. Regional coalitions have demanded strict export controls and outright bans on selling intrusive surveillance tech to autocratic governments

Advocates have also pushed companies to do more than box‑ticking “due diligence.” Work with surveillance‑tech firms in the context of migration and border control has repeatedly shown that most are still far from serious human‑rights assessments, let alone willing to turn down these lucrative contracts.

Many of the same governments that have been critical of others on the issue of human rights have hosted or licensed companies that build these tools, in some cases buying similar capabilities for their own security agencies. European authorities, for instance, have investigated FinFisher’s export of spyware “made in Germany” to Turkey and other non‑EU governments. Meanwhile, the NSO Group has at least 22 Pegasus contracts with security and law‑enforcement agencies in 12 EU countries. This is a transnational industry, not a localized problem.

Against near impossible odds, people continue finding pathways to freedom. The global surveillance sector reinforces the same hierarchies and violence that people have found ways to survive against for generations. Queer activists and others at the sharpest edges of this system have had to develop their own forms of resistance, including against biometric and data‑driven targeting. Encryption, circumvention tools, and security training are not silver bullets, but they remain essential for anyone trying to organize, document abuses, or simply exist online with a bit less risk. Resources like EFF’s Surveillance Self‑Defense are one piece of that ecosystem, alongside trainers and groups who have been doing this work on the ground for years.​

Remembering the Arab Spring in this context means not only tracing how surveillance expanded in its wake, but lifting up the people and coalitions who are still pushing back against that infrastructure today.​

Defending the Future of Digital Dissent

The Arab Spring is often remembered through images of packed squares and hopeful tweets. But living with its aftermath means confronting the surveillance architecture built in its shadow: laws that turn online speech into a crime, spyware and biometric systems that turn phones and faces into tracking beacons, and platform practices that routinely sacrifice the people most at risk. None of that is inevitable, and none of it is confined to one part of the world.

Accountability has to reach both governments and the companies that profit from arming them with these tools. That means pushing for far stronger limits on how surveillance tech is built, sold, and deployed; demanding meaningful transparency when these systems are used; and defending the tools people rely on to communicate and organize safely, including robust encryption and secure channels. It also means taking direction from people in the region who have been navigating and resisting this landscape for years, rather than only paying attention once similar abuses show up elsewhere.

Surveillance itself is transnational: tools are exported, playbooks are copied, and data moves across borders as easily as money. And so we continue our work, documenting abuses, sharing security knowledge, and collectively organizing against these violent systems.

​This is the third installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Read the rest of the series here.

Nature Climate Change, Published online: 08 April 2026; doi:10.1038/s41558-026-02609-w

Wetland methane emissions are a major source of uncertainty in global emissions estimates. Here the authors use high-resolution remote sensing data to identify small non-forested wetlands and find that they contribute 24% of wetland methane emissions and that these emissions are increasing.

MIT.nano has announced that 16 startups became active participants in its START.nano program in 2025, more than doubling the number of new companies from the previous year. Aimed at speeding the transition of hard-tech innovation to market, START.nano supports new ventures through the discounted use of MIT.nano shared facilities and a guided access to the MIT innovation ecosystem. The newly engaged startups are developing solutions for some of the world’s greatest challenges in health, climate, energy, semiconductors, novel materials, and quantum computing.

“The unique resources of MIT.nano enable not just the foundational research of academia, but the translation of that research into commercial innovations through startups,” says START.nano Program Manager Joyce Wu SM ’00, PhD ’07. “The START.nano accelerator supports early-stage companies from MIT and beyond with the tools and network they need for success.”

Launched in 2021, START.nano aims to increase the survival rate of hard-tech startups by easing their journey from the lab to the real world. In addition to receiving access to MIT.nano’s laboratories, program participants are invited to present at startup exhibits at MIT conferences, and in exclusive events including the newly launched PITCH.nano competition.

“For an early-stage startup working at the frontier of superconductor discovery, the combination of infrastructure and community has been irreplaceable,” says Jason Gibson, CEO and co-founder of Quantum Formatics. “START.nano isn’t just a resource,” adds Cynthia Liao MBA ’24, CEO and co-founder of Vertical Semiconductor. “It’s a strategic advantage that accelerates our roadmap, allowing us to iterate quickly to meet customer needs and strengthen our competitive edge.”

Although an MIT affiliation is not required, five of the 16 companies in the new cohort are led by MIT alumni, and an additional three have MIT affiliation. In total, 49 percent of the startups in START.nano are founded by MIT graduates.

Here are the intended impacts of the 16 new START.nano companies:

Acorn Genetics is developing a "smartphone of sequencing," launching the power of genetic analysis out of slow, centralized labs and into the hands of consumers for fast, portable, and affordable sequencing.

Addis Energy leverages oil, gas, and geothermal drilling technologies to unlock the chemical potential of iron-rich rocks. By injecting engineered fluids, they harness the earth’s natural energy to produce ammonia that is both abundant and cost-effective.

Augmend Health uses virtual reality and AI to deliver clinical data intelligence services for specialty care that turns incomplete documentation into revenue, compliance, and better treatment decisions.

Brightlight Photonics is building high-performance laser infrastructure at chip scale, integrating Titanium:Sapphire gain to deliver broadband, high-power, low-noise optical sources for advanced photonic systems.

Cahira Technologies is creating the new paradigm of brain-computer symbiosis for treating intractable diseases and human augmentation through autonomous, nonsurgical neural implants.

Copernic Catalysts is leveraging computational modeling to develop and commercialize transformational catalysts for low-cost and sustainable production of bulk chemicals and e-fuels.

Daqus Energy is unlocking high-energy lithium-ion batteries using critical metal-free organic cathodes.

Electrified Thermal Solutions is reinventing the firebrick to electrify industrial heat.

Guardion is making analytical instruments, chemical detectors, and radiation detectors more sensitive, portable, and easier to scale with nanomaterial-based ion detectors.

Mantel Capture is designing carbon capture materials to operate at the high temperatures found inside boilers, kilns, and furnaces — enabling highly efficient carbon capture that has not been possible until now.

nOhm Devices is developing highly-efficient cryogenic electronics for quantum computers and sensors.

Quantum Formatics is speeding discovery of the world’s next superconductors using proprietary AI.

Qunett is building the foundational hardware stack for deployable quantum networks to power the next era of global connectivity.

Rheyo is developing new ways to make dental care more effective, efficient, and easy through advanced materials and technology.

Vertical Semiconductor is commercializing high-voltage, high-density, high-efficiency vertical GaN (gallium nitride) to power the next era of compute.

VioNano Innovations is developing specialty material solutions that reduce variability and improve precision in semiconductor manufacturing, allowing chipmakers to build even smaller, faster, and more cost-effective chips.

START.nano now comprises over 32 companies and 11 graduates — ventures that have moved beyond the prototyping stages, and some into commercialization. See the full list here.

The EU’s so-called Chat Control plan, which would mandate mass scanning and other encryption breaking measures, has had some good news lately. The most controversial idea, the forced requirement to scan encrypted messages, was given up by EU member states. And now, another win for privacy: the EU Parliament has dealt a real blow to voluntary mass-scanning of chats by voting to not prolong an interim derogation from e-Privacy rules in the EU. These rules allowed service providers, temporarily, to scan private communication.  

But no one should celebrate just yet. We said there is more to it, and voluntary scanning is a key part. Unlike in the U.S., where there is no comprehensive federal privacy law, the general and indiscriminate scanning of people’s messages is not legal in the EU without a specific legal basis. The e-Privacy derogation law, which gave (limited) cover for such activities, has now expired. Does that mean mass scanning will stop overnight?  

Not really. 

Companies have continued similar scanning practices during past gaps. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Snap have already signaled in a joint statement to “continue to take voluntary action on our relevant Interpersonal Communication Services.” Whether this indicates continued scanning of our private communication is not entirely clear, but what is clear is that such activity would now risk breaching EU law. Then again, lack of compliance with EU data protection and privacy rules is nothing new for big tech in Europe. 

Most importantly, the “Chat Control” proposal for mandatory detection of child abuse material (CSAM) is still alive and being negotiated. It has shifted the focus toward so-called risk mitigation measures, such as problematic age verification and voluntary activities. If platforms are expected to adopt these as part of their compliance, they risk no longer being truly voluntary. While mass scanning may be gone on paper, some broader concerns remain.  

So, where does this leave us? The immediate priority is to make sure the expired exception for mass scanning is not revived. At the same time, lawmakers need to pull the teeth from the currently negotiated Chat Control proposal by narrowing risk mitigation measures. This means ensuring that age verification does not become a default requirement and “voluntary activities” are not turned into an expectation to scan our communications.   

As we said before, this is a zombie proposal. It keeps coming back and must not be allowed to return through the back door. 

AI is rapidly changing how software is written, deployed, and used. Trends point to a future where AIs can write custom software quickly and easily: “instant software.” Taken to an extreme, it might become easier for a user to have an AI write an application on demand—a spreadsheet, for example—and delete it when you’re done using it than to buy one commercially. Future systems could include a mix: both traditional long-term software and ephemeral instant software that is constantly being written, deployed, modified, and deleted.

AI is changing cybersecurity as well. In particular, AI systems are getting better at finding and patching vulnerabilities in code. This has implications for both attackers and defenders, depending on the ways this and related technologies improve...

A significant challenge for researchers in materials science and drug discovery is that even the most minor change to a molecule’s structure can completely alter its function. Historically, making these adjustments meant researchers had to re-synthesize the target molecule from scratch — a time-consuming and expensive bottleneck akin to tearing down a house just to move a lamp.

In an exciting discovery recently published in Nature, MIT chemists led by Professor Alison Wendlandt have developed a precision technique that allows scientists to seamlessly relocate alcohol functional groups from one spot on a molecule to a neighboring site. This process bypasses the need to rebuild the entire structure and is the result of a multi-year collaboration with Bristol Myers Squibb.

Functional group repositioning

Using a special light-sensitive molecule called decatungstate as a catalyst, the reaction triggers a highly controlled “migration” of the alcohol group. The process is remarkably predictable, ensuring the molecule retains its precise 3D shape and orientation throughout the move.

The ability to implement subtle structural tweaks without the waste of “from-scratch” synthesis eliminates a primary hurdle that has long plagued the field. Furthermore, because the reaction is gentle enough to work on complex, nearly finished structures, it serves as a powerful fine-tuning tool for late-stage drug candidates.

Precision editing to unlock new chemical designs

When combined with existing chemical methods, this tool provides new pathways to create challenging molecular architectures and oxygenation patterns that were previously out of reach.

“This alcohol migration strategy allows for precise, molecular-level tuning of oxygen atom positions,” says Qian Xu, the co-first author of the paper and a postdoc in the Wendlandt Group. “With predictable stereo- and regioselectivity and late-stage operability, it presents an enticing chance to modify natural products and drug molecules through ‘editing.’”

Ultimately, this precision editing tool holds the potential to dramatically improve the efficiency of molecular design campaigns, accelerating the development of new pharmaceuticals, materials, and agrochemicals.

In addition to Wendlandt and Xu, MIT contributors include co-lead author and graduate student Yichen Nie, recent postdoc Ronghua Zhang, and professor of chemistry Jeremiah A. Johnson. Other authors include Jacob-Jan Haaksma of the University of Groningen in The Netherlands; Natalie Holmberg-Douglas, Farid van der Mei, and Chloe Williams of of Bristol Myers Squibb; and Paul M. Scola of Actithera.

Cells rely on tiny molecules called microRNAs to tune which genes are active and when. Cells must carefully control the lifespan of microRNAs to prevent widespread disruption to gene regulation.

A new study led by researchers at MIT’s Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research and Germany’s Max Planck Institute of Biochemistry reveals how cells selectively eliminate certain microRNAs through an unexpectedly intricate molecular recognition system. The open-access work, published on March 18 in Nature, shows that the process requires two separate RNA signals, similar to how many digital systems require two forms of identity verification before granting access.

The findings explain how cells use this “two-factor authentication” system to ensure that only intended microRNAs are destroyed, leaving the rest of the gene regulation machinery in operation.

MicroRNAs are short strands of RNA that help control gene expression. Working together with a protein called Argonaute, they bind to specific messenger RNAs — the molecules that carry genetic instructions from DNA to the cell’s protein-making machinery — and trigger their destruction. In this way, microRNAs can reduce the production of specific proteins.

While scientists recognized that microRNAs could be destroyed through a pathway known as target-directed microRNA degradation, or TDMD, the details of how cells recognized which microRNAs to eliminate remained unclear.

“We knew there was a pathway that could target microRNAs for degradation, but the biochemical mechanism behind it wasn’t understood,” says MIT Professor David Bartel, a Whitehead Institute member and co-senior author of the study.

Earlier work from Bartel’s lab and others had identified a key player in this pathway: the ZSWIM8 E3 ubiquitin ligase. E3 ubiquitin ligases are involved in the cell’s recycling system and attach a small molecular tag called ubiquitin to other proteins, marking them for destruction.

The researchers first showed that the ZSWIM8 E3 ligase specifically binds and tags Argonaute, the protein that holds microRNAs and helps regulate genes. The researchers’ next challenge was to understand how this machinery recognized only Argonaute complexes carrying specific microRNAs that should be degraded.

The answer turned out to be surprisingly sophisticated.

Using a combination of biochemistry and cryo-electron microscopy — an imaging technique that reveals molecular structures at near-atomic resolution — the researchers discovered that the degradation system relies on a dual-RNA recognition process. First, Argonaute must carry a specific microRNA. Second, another RNA molecule called a “trigger RNA” must bind to that microRNA in a particular way.

The degradation machinery activates only when both signals are present.

This dual requirement ensures exquisite specificity. Each cell contains over a hundred thousand Argonaute–microRNA complexes regulating many genes, and destroying them indiscriminately would disrupt essential biological processes.

“The vast majority of Argonaute molecules in the cell are doing useful work regulating gene expression,” says Bartel, who is a professor of biology at MIT and also a Howard Hughes Medical Institute investigator. “You only want to degrade the ones carrying a particular microRNA and bound to the right trigger RNA. Without that specificity, the cell would lose its microRNAs and the essential regulation that they provide.”

The structural images revealed complex molecular interactions. The ZSWIM8 ligase detects multiple structural changes that occur when the two RNAs bind together within the Argonaute protein.

“When we saw the structure, everything clicked,” says Elena Slobodyanyuk, a graduate student in Bartel’s lab and co-first author of the study. “You could see how the pairing of the trigger RNA with the microRNA reshapes the Argonaute complex in a way that the ligase can recognize.”

Beyond explaining how TDMD works, the findings may impact how scientists think about the regulation of RNA molecules more broadly.

“A lot of E3 ligases recognize their targets through simpler signals,” says Jakob Farnung, co-first author and researcher in the Department of Molecular Machines and Signaling at the Max Planck Institute of Biochemistry. “It was like opening a treasure chest where every detail revealed something new and mesmerizing.”

MicroRNAs typically persist in cells for much longer time periods than most messenger RNAs, but some degrade far more quickly, and the TDMD pathway appears to account for many of these unusually short-lived microRNAs.

The researchers are now investigating whether other RNAs can trigger similar degradation pathways and whether additional microRNAs are regulated through variations of the mechanism shown in this study.

“This opens up a whole new way of thinking about how RNA molecules can control protein degradation,” says Brenda Schulman, study co-senior author and director of the Department of Molecular Machines and Signaling at the Max Planck Institute of Biochemistry. “Here, the recognition was far more elaborate than expected. There’s likely much more left to discover.”

Uncovering the details of this intricate regulatory system required interdisciplinary collaboration, combining expertise in RNA biochemistry, structural biology, and ubiquitin enzymology to solve this long-standing molecular puzzle.

“This was a project that required the strengths of two labs working at the forefront of their fields,” says Schulman, who is also an alum of Whitehead Institute. “It was an incredible team effort.”

Chronic wound infections are notoriously difficult to manage because some bacteria can actively interfere with the body’s immune defenses. In wounds, Enterococcus faecalis (E. faecalis) is particularly resilient — it can survive inside tissues, alter the wound environment, and weaken immune signals at the injury site. This disruption creates conditions where other microbes can easily establish themselves, resulting in multi-species infections that are complex and slow to resolve. Such persistent wounds, including diabetic foot ulcers and post-surgical infections, place a heavy burden on patients and health care systems, and sometimes lead to serious complications such as amputations.

Now, researchers have discovered how E. faecalis releases lactic acid to acidify its surroundings and suppresses the immune-cell signal needed to start a proper response to infection. By silencing the body’s defenses, the bacterium can cause persistent and hard-to-treat wound infections. This explains why some wounds struggle to heal, even with treatment, and why infections involving multiple bacteria are especially difficult to eradicate.

The work was led by researchers from the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART) Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) interdisciplinary research group, alongside collaborators from the Singapore Centre for Environmental Life Sciences Engineering at Nanyang Technological University (NTU Singapore), MIT, and the University of Geneva in Switzerland.

In a paper titled “Enterococcus faecalis-derived lactic acid suppresses macrophage activation to facilitate persistent and polymicrobial wound infections,” recently published in Cell Host & Microbe, the researchers documented how E. faecalis releases large amounts of lactic acid during infection. This acidity suppresses the activation of macrophages — immune cells that normally help to clear infections — and interferes with several important internal processes that help the cell recognize and respond to infection. As a result, the mechanisms that cells rely on to send out “danger” signals are suppressed, leaving the macrophages unable to fully activate.

Researchers found that E. faecalis uses a two‑step mechanism to achieve this. Lactic acid enters the macrophages through a lactate transporter called MCT‑1 and also binds to a lactate-sensing receptor, GPR81, on the cell surface. By engaging both pathways, the bacterium effectively shuts down downstream immune signalling and blocks the macrophage’s inflammatory response, allowing E. faecalis to persist in the wound much longer than it should. Specifically, the lactic acid prevents a key immune alarm signal, known as NF-κB, from switching on inside these cells.

This was proven in a mouse wound model, where strains of E. faecalis that could not make lactic acid were cleared much more quickly, and the wounds also showed stronger immune activity. In wounds infected with both E. faecalis and Escherichia coli, the weakened immune response caused by lactic acid also allowed E. coli to grow better. This explains why wound infections often involve multiple species of bacteria and become harder to treat over time, particularly since E. faecalis is among the most common bacteria found in chronic wounds.

“Chronic wound infections often fail not because antibiotics are powerless, but because the immune system has effectively been ‘switched off’ at the infection site. We found that E. faecalis floods the wound with lactic acid, lowering pH and muting the NF‑κB alarm inside macrophages — the very cells that should be calling for help. By pinpointing how acidity rewires immune signalling, we now have clear targets to reactivate the immune response,” says first author Ronni da Silva, research scientist at SMART AMR, former postdoc in the lab of co-author and MIT professor of biology Jianzhu Chen, and SCELSE-NTU visiting researcher.

“This discovery strengthens our understanding of host-pathogen interactions and offers new directions for developing treatments and wound care that target the bacteria’s immunosuppressive strategies. By revealing how the immune response is shut down, this research may help improve infection management and support better recovery outcomes for patients, especially those with chronic wounds or weakened immunity,” says Kimberly Kline, principal investigator at SMART AMR, SCELSE-NTU visiting academic, professor at the University of Geneva, and corresponding author of the paper.

By identifying lactic‑acid‑driven immune suppression as a root cause of persistent wound infections, this work highlights the potential of treatment approaches that support the immune system, rather than rely on antibiotics alone. This could lead to therapies that help wounds heal more reliably and reduce the risk of complications. Potential directions include reducing acidity in the wound or blocking the signals that lactic acid uses to switch off immune cells.

Building on their study, the researchers plan to explore validation in additional pathogens and human wound samples, followed by assessments in advanced preclinical models ahead of any potential clinical trials.

The research was partially supported by the National Research Foundation Singapore under its Campus for Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise program.

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