Grupo Seguritech is a Mexican surveillance company that is expanding into the US.

Berlin is seeking targeted amendments to the cap-and-trade carbon program to strengthen the bloc’s competitiveness and safeguard its industrial base.

Energy generated from the sun has doubled its share in the country over the past decade, the think tank said.

BHP last month warned staff that the Queensland mines were unprofitable.

The current geopolitical scene has affected the race, and "potential candidates and the governments who sponsor them are much more cautious," said an expert.

For years, EFF has pushed technology companies to make real human rights commitments—and to live up to them. In response to growing evidence that Palantir’s tools help power abusive immigration enforcement by ICE, we sent the company a detailed letter asking how the promises in its own human rights framework extends to that work.

This post explains what we asked, how Palantir responded, and why we believe those responses fall short. EFF is not alone in raising alarms about Palantir; immigrants' rights groups, human rights organizations, journalists, and former employees have raised similar concerns based on reports of the company's role in abusive immigration enforcement. We focus here on Palantir’s own human rights promises.

At the outset, we appreciate that Palantir was willing to engage respectfully, and we recognize that confidentiality and security obligations can limit what it can say. Nonetheless, measured against Palantir's own human rights commitments, its decision to keep powering ICE with tools used in dragnet raids and discriminatory detentions is indefensible. A good-faith application of those commitments should lead Palantir to end its contract with ICE, and refuse new, or end current, contracts with any other agency whose work predictably violates those commitments.

Palantir’s Public Promises

Palantir has long said it performs comprehensive human rights analysis on its work. It has also worked with ICE for years, apparently in a more limited capacity than today. It has publicly embraced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Additionally, in its response to EFF, Palantir says its legal responsibilities are only “the floor” for broader risk assessments.

That was the point of our letter. We asked what human rights due diligence Palantir conducted when it first contracted with ICE and DHS; whether it performed the “proactive risk scoping” it advertises, how it reviews work over time, what it has done in response to reports of misuse, and whether it has used “every means at [its] disposal”—including contract provisions, third‑party oversight, and termination—to prevent or mitigate harms.

For the most part, Palantir did not answer our accountability questions. It did correct one point: Palantir says it does not currently work with CBP, and available evidence supports that, though it also made clear it could work with CBP in the future.

Palantir also raised a red herring it often deploys in response to criticism. It denied building a 'mega' or 'master' database for ICE and denied creating a database of protesters, which some ICE agents have claimed to have been built. We call it a red herring because those denials sidestep the central issues: what capabilities Palantir's tools actually provide to ICE.

To be clear, EFF has never claimed that Palantir is building a single centralized database. Our concern is grounded in how Palantir’s tools allow ICE to query and analyze data from multiple databases through a unified interface—which from an agent’s perspective can be a distinction without a difference.

In the sections that follow, we compare Palantir’s account of its work for ICE with evidence about how its tools seem to be used, and explain why legality, internal process, and sustained “engagement with the institutions whose vital tasks exist in tension with certain human rights” are no substitute for real human rights due diligence—because respect for human rights must be measured by outcomes, not just process.

Palantir’s ICE Work Undermines Its Own Standards

Palantir says ICE uses its ELITE tool for “prioritized enforcement”: to surface likely addresses of specific people, such as individuals with final orders of removal or high‑severity criminal charges. But according to sworn testimony in Oregon, ICE agents use ELITE to determine where to conduct deportation sweeps, and the system “pulled from all kinds of sources” to identify locations for raids aimed at mass detentions, including information from the Department of Health and Human Services such as Medicaid data. A leaked ELITE user guide for 'Special Operations' also instructs operators to disable filters to "display all targets within a Special Operations dataset." Those details directly conflict with Palantir’s narrow description of ELITE’s role.

Additionally, Palantir's response leans on legal authority and the Privacy Act. But it does not identify any specific lawful basis for using Medicaid data in this way or explain how its software enables that access. Even if a legal theory exists, turning sensitive medical information into fuel for dragnet sweeps is hard to reconcile with its commitments to privacy, equity, and the rights of impacted communities. Its own human rights framework requires grappling with foreseeable harms its products may enable, not just invoking possible legal authorization.   

Reporting shows that many people detained by ICE had no criminal record, much less a serious one, and in many cases no final order of removal. An overwhelming percentage of those detained were, or appeared to be, from Central and South America, and nearly one in five ICE arrests were street arrests of a Latine person with neither a criminal history nor a removal order.

These facts raise obvious questions about discriminatory impact, racial profiling, and whether Palantir's tools are facilitating detention practices far broader than the company claims. Palantir's response does not meaningfully engage those questions, despite the company's commitments to non-discrimination and due process.

EFF’s letter asked Palantir to explain how it is honoring its commitments to civil liberties in light of reports linking Palantir-owned systems to facial recognition and other tools used to identify and target people engaged in observing and recording law enforcement, including in connection with the deaths of Renée Good and Alex Pretti. The letter also cites an incident in which an officer scanned protesters’ and observers’ faces and threatened to add their biometrics to a “nice little database.” Palantir’s response denies involvement in any such database.

A narrow denial about a single database does not answer the broader question: if ICE, its customer, claims it has this capability, what has Palantir done to ensure its tools are not used to chill protected speech, retaliate against observers, or facilitate targeting of people engaged in First Amendment‑protected activity? For a company that claims to value democracy and civil liberties, this is not a marginal issue; it goes to the heart of its human rights commitments.

Legality, Process, and Engagement with ICE Are Not Human Rights Standards

As mentioned above, Palantir leans heavily on legal compliance. It says government data sharing is “subject to, and governed by, data sharing agreements and government oversight” and that any sharing it facilitates is done according to “legal and technical requirements, including those of the Privacy Act of 1974.” It describes its role in ELITE as “data integration,” enabling ICE “to incorporate data sources to which it has access,” including data shared under inter‑agency agreements.

EFF is very familiar with the Privacy Act—we are suing the Office of Personnel Management over it currently. But Palantir’s response does not clarify how ICE legally has access to this information, how Palantir ensures that it follows those legal processes, or how Palantir’s software may have enabled access in the first place. More critically, that is still a legal answer to a human rights question, and legal compliance alone is insufficient as a human rights standard.

Human rights due diligence requires assessing foreseeable harms, responding to credible evidence of abuse, and changing course when the facts demand it—something Palantir, on paper, recognizes. That’s why it stresses that its legal responsibilities are only “the floor for [its] broader risk assessments,” pointing to the way it built toward GDPR‑style data protection principles and incorporated international humanitarian law principles before those requirements were formalized. If those commitments mean anything, Palantir has to explain how specific practices—like enabling ICE to use Medicaid data in dragnet raids—square with that broader standard.

Palantir also leans heavily on process. It points to a “layered approach” to risk, frameworks that purportedly examine multiple dimensions of privacy and equity, and “indelible” audit logs that track how its tools are used. Audit logs are not sufficient for protecting human rights. There is a long history of authoritarian regimes keeping extensive logs of their human rights abuses. Those structures can be useful for protecting human rights, but only if they are used to detect harm, trigger reassessment, and lead to changes in design, access, support, or contract enforcement when credible reports of abuse emerge.

That is why we pressed Palantir to spell out clearly what reports of misuse Palantir has received, what changes it made, and on what timeline. Again, instead of offering specific examples, Palantir points back to its internal framework and its willingness to “move towards the hardest problems” as evidence of effective efforts. But human rights are an outcome, not just a process.

Human rights due diligence is not a one-time approval at contract signing; under the UN Guiding Principles, it is supposed to be continuous, with new facts triggering reassessment. Complaints, media reports, leaks, litigation, and sworn testimony are exactly the kinds of events that should prompt review. If Palantir has an account for that work— how often it reviews ICE contracts, who conducts the reviews, what triggers them, and how findings reach the Board— it had every opportunity to describe it. Instead, it offered a generic assurance that it remains committed to human rights without engaging in the specifics. Confidentiality may sometimes limit disclosure, but it is no substitute for accountability.

What Needs to Happen Next 

Palantir wants credit for “mov[ing] towards the hardest problems” and engaging with institutions whose missions it says are “in tension with certain human rights” while having a human rights framework. But when the record includes violent raids, dragnet detentions, use of sensitive medical data, discriminatory targeting, retaliation against observers, and deaths tied to immigration enforcement operations, pointing to a values page is not enough; it has to reckon with the results.

Voluntary corporate human rights policies often function as weak accountability mechanisms: companies can tout principles, publish policies, and answer criticism with polished statements while changing very little on the ground. Palantir’s response fits that pattern all too well. EFF will continue to challenge its role in abusive immigration enforcement and demanding more accountability for technology vendors whose tools enable human rights violations. We are also happy to continue a dialogue with Palantir to that end. For now, this much is clear: Palantir needs to reconsider its contract with ICE and with all agencies whose work predictably violate human rights.

Section 230 helps make it possible for online communities to host user speech: from restaurant reviews, to fan fiction, to collaborative encyclopedias. But recent debates about the law often overlook how it works in practice. To mark its 30th anniversary, EFF is interviewing leaders of online platforms about how they handle complaints, moderate content, and protect their users’ ability to speak and share information. 

Reddit is one of the largest user-generated content platforms on the internet, built around thousands of independent communities known as subreddits. Some subreddits cover everyday interests, while others host discussions about specialized or controversial topics. These communities are created and moderated by volunteers, and the site’s decentralized model means that Reddit hosts a vast range of user speech without relying on centralized editorial control. 

Ben Lee is Chief Legal Officer at Reddit, where he oversees the company’s legal strategy and policy work on issues including content moderation and intermediary liability. Before joining Reddit, Lee held senior legal roles at other tech companies including Plaid, Twitter, and Google. At Reddit, he has been closely involved in litigation and policy debates surrounding Section 230, including cases addressing the legal risks faced by platforms and their users and moderators. He was interviewed by Joe Mullin, a policy analyst on EFF's Activism Team.

Joe Mullin: When we talk about user rights and Section 230, what rights are most at stake on a platform like Reddit? 

Ben Lee: Reddit, we often say, is the most human place on the internet. What’s often missing from the debate is that section 230 protects people—not platforms. 

It protects millions of everyday humans and volunteer moderators who participate in online communities. Without it, people could face lawsuits for voting down a post, enforcing community rules, or moderating a discussion. These are foundational activities on Reddit, and frankly, the whole internet.

If you had to describe section 230 to a regular Reddit user without naming the law, what would you say it does for them?

Section 230 protects your ability to participate in community moderation.

Even if all you are doing is up-voting or down-voting content, that’s participation. On Reddit, everyone is a content moderator, through voting. Up-voting determines the visibility of content. 

We believe, strongly, this is one of the only models to allow Reddit to scale. You make the community part of the moderation process. They’re invested in the community, making it better. 

How would user speech be affected if Section 230 were eliminated or weakened? 

We would undermine community self governance—the notion that humans can do content moderation, and take that responsibility for themselves. Whether you’re a small blog or big forum. I like to think of Reddit as composed of this federation of communities that range from the tiny to the humongous. That’s what the internet is! 

The legal risk would discourage people from moderating, or even speaking at all. The kind of speech we’re trying to protect is often critical of powerful people or entities. If a moderation decision leads to litigation from those powerful entities, that’s an expensive proposition to fight. 

Reddit relies on user-run communities and volunteer moderators. Can you walk me through how content moderation and legal complaints actually work in practice, and where section 230 comes into that? 

We have a tiered structure, like our federal system. Each community is like a state: it has its own rules, and enforces them. The vast majority of content moderation decisions are made by the communities, not by Reddit itself. 

Reddit is built on self-governing communities that are moderated by volunteers, supported by automated tools. Section 230 gives Reddit the freedom to experiment, and lets users shape healthy, interest-based spaces.

Section 230 is fundamental to protecting the moderators from a frivolous lawsuit. A screenwriting community might want to protect their community from scammy competitions—and then they get sued by that competition. 

Or a community wants to keep their conversation civil. And, for example, may not allow Star Trek characters to be called “soy boys,” and they enforce that. Then a person sues. 

I wish these were hypotheticals. But they were actual lawsuits. And we have them, routinely. 

What are policymakers missing about Section 230? 

The [moderation] decisions being criticized in court, are decisions to try to make the internet safer. In none of the cases that I mentioned is there a moderator saying, “I want to increase harmful content!” These are good-faith decisions about what makes the internet better. 

Section 230 is, at its core, protecting the ability for people to make those choices for their own communities. 

There's a price to be paid for not having a Section 230. And it will be paid by internet users—not the biggest platforms.

Some see 230 as a way to punish Big Tech. But removing it doesn't punish Big Tech—it makes them more powerful. It's startups, community driven platforms, and individual moderators who rely on Section 230 to compete and innovate. Weakening Section 230 will harm the open internet, and reduce the choice, diversity, and resilience of the internet. 

The big guys, they have armies of lawyers. They have the budget to withstand a flood of lawsuits. Weakening Section 230 just entrenches them. 

In Reddit’s amicus brief in the Gonzalez v. Google Supreme Court case, you point out that without Section 230, many moderation decisions wouldn’t be protected. The brief states: “A plaintiff might claim emotional distress from a truthful but hurtful post that gained prominence when a moderator highlighted it as a trending topic. Or, a plaintiff might claim interference with economic relations arising from an honest but very critical two-star restaurant review.” 

When you have situations where moderators get threats or litigation, what can you do? 

We have had cases where our own moderators got sued, along with us. In the “soy boy” case, we worked to help find pro bono counsel for the moderators. 

Someone posted “Wesley Crusher is a soy boy,” and it got removed. I'm enough of a Star Trek fan that I understand both the reference, and why the moderator decided—“hey, it's gone. I don't want this here.”

This would not violate our Reddit rules. But the community took it down under its own rules about being civil. It was just not a kind-hearted action, and the community had a right to decide. 

But the moderator got sued. We got sued, actually, because the poster disagreed with that moderation choice. Section 230 is what allowed us to win that case. 

These are just average people, implicated only because they moderated their own community. They are trying to do the right thing by their community. 

In cases where litigation happens, when does Section 230 come into play? 

Section 230 is usually one of the first things that's talked about in the case. It’s usually the most effective way of saying: if you believe someone who defamed you—please go to the person who has defamed you. If you’re looking to the moderator, or to Reddit itself, this is not a great way of getting the justice that you seek. 

Is there a different workflow internationally? 

There’s a very different workflow. We had a prominent case in France where a company was trying to sue moderators, and of course, we didn't have section 230 to protect them. So we had to do all sorts of other things to protect them. It got much more complicated. 

The breadth of content that's considered illegal in certain jurisdictions can be somewhat breathtaking. 

Our goal is always to preserve as much freedom of expression as possible for our community. In the U.S., we look at it through the lens of the First Amendment, and other aspects. Outside the U.S., we rely more on the lens of international human rights. 

How would you characterize legal demands around user content, the ones you see most often? 

They tend to be: somebody said something mean about me—take this down. Or someone says: you didn’t allow me to say something mean about someone or some entity. It completely runs the spectrum. 

One law that has already passed that weakens Section 230 is SESTA/FOSTA. From Reddit’s perspective, what changed after that? 

There's some communities we had to shut down, in particular, support communities. There was a cost. Every time Section 230 is narrowed, there’s a cost—some types of speech and communities have a harder time staying online. 

The cost may not seem high to some people, because those communities are not for them. But if they visited them, they’d see that these are actual people, interacting in a positive way. If it wasn’t positive, we have rules for that—but that’s a different question. 

The New York Times has a long article where the author lays out an impressive array of circumstantial evidence that the inventor of Bitcoin is the cypherpunk Adam Back.

I don’t know. The article is convincing, but it’s written to be convincing.

I can’t remember if I ever met Adam. I was a member of the Cypherpunks mailing list for a while, but I was never really an active participant. I spent more time on the Usenet newsgroup sci.crypt. I knew a bunch of the Cypherpunks, though, from various conferences around the world at the time. I really have no opinion about who Satoshi Nakamoto really is...

Conservative justices focused on industry costs when blocking the Clean Power Plan, the first climate rule proposed for the power sector.

The court sided with the oil industry in a lawsuit over damage to Louisiana’s eroding coastline.

Countries are navigating between the desire to speed up their green transition and worries over Beijing’s clean-tech dominance.

House Science Chair Brian Babin says he has questions about the report committee's "composition, objectivity, and funding."

A new IEA report shows how the clean energy transition has accelerated, despite U.S. policies aimed at slowing renewable energy growth.

The Trump administration will pull its emergency levers to head off a major water and power crisis.

The Defense Department is still engaged on one front of the climate fight: steeling its bases against the effects of a warming atmosphere, such as higher seas, fiercer storms and deadlier fires.

Both banks cited the geopolitical and energy security context.

The Nuclear Regulation Authority said nuclear power plants and related facilities in the region were all intact and no abnormalities were detected.

Nature Climate Change, Published online: 20 April 2026; doi:10.1038/s41558-026-02636-7

Publisher Correction: Neglecting land–atmosphere feedbacks overestimates climate-driven increases in evapotranspiration

Chances are, you’ve already used a satellite today. Satellites make it possible for us to stream our favorite shows, call and text a friend, check weather and navigation apps, and make an online purchase. Satellites also monitor the Earth’s climate, the extent of agricultural crops, wildlife habitats, and impacts from natural disasters.

As we’ve found more uses for them, satellites have exploded in number. Today, there are more than 10,000 satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. Another 5,000 decommissioned satellites drift through this region, along with over 100 million pieces of debris comprising everything from spent rocket stages to flecks of spacecraft paint.

For MIT’s Richard Linares, the rapid ballooning of satellites raises pressing questions: How can we safely manage traffic and growing congestion in space? And at what point will we reach orbital capacity, where adding more satellites is not sustainable, and may in fact compromise spacecraft and the services that we rely on?

“It is a judgement that society has to make, of what value do we derive from launching more satellites,” says Linares, who recently received tenure as an associate professor in MIT’s Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AeroAstro). “One of the things we try to do is approach these questions of traffic management and orbital capacity as engineering problems.”

Linares leads the MIT Astrodynamics, Space Robotics, and Controls Lab (ARCLab), a research group that applies astrodynamics (the motion and trajectory of orbiting objects) to help track and manage the millions of objects in orbit around the Earth. The group also develops tools to predict how space traffic and debris will change as operators launch large satellite “mega-constellations” into space.

He is also exploring the effects of space weather on satellites, as well as how climate change on Earth may limit the number of satellites that can safely orbit in space. And, anticipating that satellites will have to be smarter and faster to navigate a more cluttered environment, Linares is looking into artificial intelligence to help satellites autonomously learn and reason to adapt to changing conditions and fix issues onboard.

“Our research is pretty diverse,” Linares says. “But overall, we want to enable all these economic opportunities that satellites give us. And we are figuring out engineering solutions to make that possible.”

Grounding practical problems

Linares was born and raised in Yonkers, New York. His parents both worked as school bus drivers to support their children, Linares being the youngest of six. He was an active kid and loved sports, playing football throughout high school.

“Sports was a way to stay focused and organized, and to develop a work ethic,” Linares says. “It taught me to work hard.”

When applying for colleges, rather than aim for Division I schools like some of his teammates, Linares looked for programs that were strong in science, specifically in aerospace. Growing up, he was fascinated with Carl Sagan’s “Cosmos” docuseries. And being close to Manhattan, he took regular trips to the Hayden Planetarium to take in the center’s immersive projections of space and the technologies used to explore it.

“My interest in science came from the universe and trying to understand our place within it,” Linares recalls.

Choosing to stay close to home, he applied to in-state schools with strong aeronautical engineering departments, and happily landed at the State University of New York at Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo), where he would ultimately earn his bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees, all in aerospace engineering.

As an undergraduate, Linares took on a research project in astrodynamics, looking to solve the problem of how to determine the relative orientation of satellites flying in formation.

“Formation flying was a big topic in the early 2000s,” Linares says. “I liked the flavor of the math involved, which allowed me to go a layer deeper toward a solution.”

He worked out the math to show that when three satellites fly together, they essentially form a triangle, the angles of which can be calculated to determine where each satellite is in relation to the other two at any moment in time. His work introduced a new controls approach to enable satellites to fly safely together. The research had direct applications for the U.S. Air Force, which helped to sponsor the work.

As he expanded the research into a master’s thesis, Linares also took opportunities to work directly with the Air Force on issues of satellite tracking and orientation. He served two internships with the U.S. Air Force Research Lab, one at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the other in Maui, Hawaii.

“Being able to collaborate with the Air Force back then kind of grounded the research in practical problems,” Linares says.

For his PhD, he turned to another practical problem of “uncorrelated tracks.” At the time, the Air Force operated a network of telescopes to observe more than 20,000 objects in space, which they were working to label and record in a catalog to help them track the objects over time. But while detecting objects was relatively straightforward, the challenge came in correlating a detected object with what was already in the catalog. In other words, is what they were seeing something they had already seen?

Linares developed image analysis techniques to identify key characteristics of objects such as their shape and orientation, which helped the Air Force “fingerprint” satellites and pieces of space debris, and track their activity — and potential for collisions — over time.

After completing his PhD, Linares worked as a postdoc at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the U.S. Naval Observatory. During that time he expanded his aerospace work to other areas including space weather, using satellite measurements to model how Earth’s ionosphere — the upper layer of the atmosphere that is ionized by the sun’s radiation — affects satellite drag.

He then accepted a position as assistant professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis. For the next three years, he continued his research in modeling space weather, tracking space objects and coordinating satellites to fly in swarms.

Making space

In 2018, Linares made the move to MIT.

“I had a lot of respect for the people and for the history of the work that was done here,” says Linares, who was especially inspired by the legendary Charles Stark “Doc” Draper, who developed the first inertial guidance systems in the 1940s that would enable the self-navigation of airplanes, submarines, satellites, and spacecraft for decades to come. “This was essentially my field, and I knew MIT was the best place to continue my career.”

As a junior faculty member in AeroAstro, Linares spent his first years focused on an emerging challenge: space sustainability. Around that time, the first satellite constellations were launching into low-Earth orbit with SpaceX’s Starlink, which aimed to provide global internet coverage via a huge network of several thousand coordinating satellites. The launching of so many satellites, into orbits that already held other active and nonactive satellites, along with millions of pieces of space debris, raised questions about how to safely manage the satellite traffic and how much traffic an orbit can sustain.

“At what level do we reach a tipping point, where we have too many satellites in certain orbital regimes?” Linares says. “It was kind of a known problem at the time, but there weren’t many solutions.”

Linares’ group applied an understanding of astrodynamics, and the physics of how objects move in space, to figure out the best way to pack satellites in orbital “shells,” or lanes that would most likely prevent collisions. They also developed a state-of-the-art model of orbital traffic, that was able to simulate the trajectories of more than 10 million individual objects in space. Previous models were much more limited in the number of objects they could accurately simulate. Linares’ open-source model, called the MIT Orbital Capacity Assessment Tool, or MOCAT, could account for the millions of pieces of space debris, in addition to the many intact satellites in orbit.

The tools that his group has developed are used today by satellite operators to plan and predict safe spacecraft trajectories. His team is continuing to work on problems of space traffic management and orbital capacity. They are also branching out into space robotics. The team is testing ways to teleoperate a humanoid robot, which could potentially help to build future infrastructure and carry out long-duration tasks in space.

Linares is also exploring artificial intelligence, including ways that a satellite can autonomously “learn” from its experience and safely adapt to uncertain environments.

“Imagine if each satellite had a virtual Doc Draper onboard that could do the de-bugging that we did from the ground during the Apollo missions,” Linares says. “That way, satellites would become instantaneously more robust. And it’s not taking the human out of the equation. It’s allowing the human to be amplified. I think that’s within reach.”

Pretty fantastic video from Japan of a giant squid eating another squid.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Blog moderation policy.